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Little information is available in the United States
regarding the incidence and distribution of diseases caused
by critical microbiologic agents with the potential for use in
acts of terrorism. We describe disease-specific, demo-
graphic, geographic, and seasonal distribution of selected
bioterrorism-related conditions (anthrax, botulism, brucel-
losis, cholera, plague, tularemia, and viral encephalitides)
reported to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance
System in 1992 to 1999. Tularemia and brucellosis were
the most frequently reported diseases. Anthrax, plague,
western equine encephalitis, and eastern equine
encephalitis were rare. Higher incidence rates for cholera
and plague were noted in the western United States and for
tularemia in the central United States. Overall, the inci-
dence of conditions caused by these critical agents in the
United States is low. Individual case reports should be con-
sidered sentinel events. For potential bioterrorism-related
conditions that are endemic and have low incidence, the
use of nontraditional surveillance methods and comple-
mentary data sources may enhance our ability to rapidly
detect changes in disease incidence.
I
n 2001, anthrax cases associated with the intentional dis-
tribution of Bacillus anthracis spores through the postal
system re-emphasized that the deliberate exposure of
humans to biologic agents can happen in the United States
(1,2). Before the 2001 bioterrorism-associated anthrax
events, terrorist attacks (e.g., the bombings of the World
Trade Center in New York City in 1993, the Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, and the Olympic
Games in Atlanta in 1996; and an increase in intentional
anthrax exposure hoaxes [3]) had already created substan-
tial media and public attention because they highlighted
our susceptibility to domestic terrorism, including bioter-
rorism. In addition, smaller focused acts of bacteriologic
criminal assault had occurred in the United States, includ-
ing the intentional contamination of salad bars with
Salmonella organisms in 1984 in Oregon (4) and of
muffins and pastries with Shigella organisms in Texas in
1996 (5); these acts served as a wake-up call announcing
the threat of domestic bioterrorism. All of these events led
the United States to revisit and update a national plan for
bioterrorism preparedness and response in the late 1990s.
In defining the role of the public health community in the
detection of and response to bioterrorism, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identified 10 major
areas of need. One of these areas is ensuring reliable and
timely disease surveillance and reporting to detect and
investigate outbreaks (6).
In response to global bioterrorism threats, CDC has
proposed a list of critical biologic agents that have poten-
tial for use in a terrorist incident (6–9). This list includes a
wide range of biologic agents and prioritizes pathogens
into three categories on the basis of their potential to affect
the public’s health, their potential for dissemination, and
special needs for effective public health intervention.
Prioritization of bioterrorism “threat” agents facilitates
coordinated planning efforts for preparedness and response
to bioterrorism at the local, state, and federal levels.
Using this guidance, public health systems can address
the threat of bioterrorism by increasing healthcare sector
awareness of and surveillance for these bioterrorism-relat-
ed agents and the diseases they cause (10). In the United
States, public health surveillance for conditions caused by
the identified critical biologic agents is conducted in mul-
tiple ways. Although data regarding these agents are
reported to different national surveillance systems at CDC,
no single system is specifically designed for conducting
surveillance for all bioterrorism-related agents or condi-
tions. However, many states have routinely conducted sur-
veillance for some of these conditions and report incidence
data to CDC’s National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance
System (NNDSS) each week (Table 1).
We describe disease-specific trends in demographic
characteristics and geographic and seasonal distribution of
selected conditions caused by critical biologic agents
reported to NNDSS. These diseases and conditions include
anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, cholera, plague, tularemia,
and selected viral encephalitides. By identifying patterns
of endemic disease associated with critical agents, we
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USAestablish a baseline against which future disease incidence
can be compared. This process should allow easier identi-
fication of unusual reports of disease incidence, which in
turn will enhance the ability of the public health communi-
ty to identify and investigate outbreaks. 
Methods
Data and Sources
We analyzed NNDSS data voluntarily reported to CDC
from state health departments from 1992 to 1999 (11). As
of 1999, a total of 56 infectious diseases or conditions with
public health surveillance case definitions (12,13) were
considered nationally notifiable, as agreed upon by the
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists and CDC
(14). Each year, the Council and CDC review the list of
nationally notifiable infectious diseases to determine
whether conditions should be added or removed as new
pathogens emerge or disease incidence changes (15).
Based on state-specific health priorities, each state inde-
pendently determines which of the nationally notifiable
diseases should be made notifiable (i.e., legally reportable
by healthcare providers or laboratories to the public health
system within their jurisdiction). As a result, not all nation-
ally notifiable diseases are legally reportable in all states.
With some variation by jurisdiction, the completeness of
public health surveillance is dependent on healthcare
providers and laboratories submitting disease incidence or
laboratory reports to local and county health departments,
who then forward reports to the state health departments
(16). Each week, health departments in 50 states, New
York City (a separate reporting jurisdiction from New York
State), the District of Columbia, and 5 U.S. territories com-
pile surveillance data from their reporting sites and volun-
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Table 1. Number of reported cases and number of states reporting conditions caused by critical biological agents, National Notifiable Diseases 
Surveillance System, United States, 1992–1999
a,b 
Y  Anthrax 
Botulism, 
foodborne 
Botulism, 
Other
c  Brucellosis  Cholera 
Encephalitis, 
eastern 
equine 
Encephalitis, 
western 
equine  Plague  Tularemia 
1992–1999                   
   Total cases  1  223  148  813  223  29  1  77  885 
1992                   
   Cases  1  21  4  105  103  N  N  13  159 
   States reporting  1  8  2  22  12  N  N  7  26 
   States requiring reporting  52  52  52  52  52  N  N  52  52 
1993                   
   Cases  0  27  5  120  25  N  N  11  132 
   States reporting  0  10  3  23  11  N  N  4  24 
   States requiring reporting  52  52  52  52  52  N  N  52  52 
1994                   
   Cases  0  50  8  119  39  N  N  17  96 
   States reporting  0  11  1  21  14  N  N  5  29 
   States requiring reporting  52  52  52  52  52  N  N  52  51 
1995                   
   Cases  0  24  19  98  23  1  0  9  117 
   States reporting  0  9  4  24  14  1  0  4  24 
   States requiring reporting  52  52  52  52  52  U  U  51  N 
1996                   
   Cases  0  25  22  112  4  5  0  5  88 
   States reporting  0  10  4  29  4  4  0  3  24 
   States requiring reporting  52  52  51  52  52  U  U  52  N 
1997                   
   Cases  0  31  22  98  6  14  0  4  101 
   States reporting  0  8  5  26  5  6  0  3  24 
   States requiring reporting  50  52  51  51  51  U  U  51  N 
1998                   
   Cases  0  22  29  79  17  4  0  9  96 
   States reporting  0  6  2  27  7  4  0  4  22 
   States requiring reporting  52  52  51  50  52  48  48  50  U 
1999                   
   Cases  0  23  39  82  6  5  1  9  96 
   States reporting  0  8  5  18  5  2  1  2  27 
   States requiring reporting  52  52  52  51  52  48  49  51  U 
aAbbreviations used: N, not nationally notifiable; U, unknown. 
bReports from 50 U.S. states, Washington, D.C., and New York City. 
cIncludes wound and unspecified botulism. tarily transmit disease incidence data to CDC through the
National Electronic Telecommunications System for
Surveillance.
Conditions associated with critical biologic agents that
were nationally notifiable, reported to NNDSS, and
included in this study were anthrax, botulism, brucellosis,
cholera, plague, tularemia, and selected viral encephali-
tides. Botulism is reported as two distinct conditions: food-
borne botulism and other or unspecified forms of botulism,
including wound botulism. All of the study conditions,
except tularemia and selected viral encephalitides, were
designated as nationally notifiable throughout the study
period. Other than tularemia, only cases reported for those
diseases designated as nationally notifiable and from states
in which the disease was legally reportable were analyzed.
Although tularemia was deleted from the nationally notifi-
able disease list in 1995 because of decreasing incidence,
the disease remained reportable in most states, and the
annual number of cases reported to NNDSS remained sta-
ble in subsequent years; therefore, tularemia incidence
data for the entire study period were included in the analy-
sis.
Analysis
Incidence rates were calculated for the demographic
and geographic descriptors of sex, age (grouped as <1
year, 1–4, 5–14, 15–24, 25–39, 40–64, and >65 years),
racial category (American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian
or Pacific Islander, black, white, and other), Hispanic eth-
nicity, and state of residence. Seasonal incidence (spring,
summer, fall, and winter) was examined on the basis of
data reported with one of three types of dates: onset date,
date of diagnosis, or date of laboratory result. 
Average annual age-, sex-, race-, ethnicity-, and state-
specific disease incidence rates for the period 1992–1999
were estimated by averaging the total annual number of
case counts by subcategory, and dividing by the study’s
mid-year (1995) U.S. population. State-specific annual
incidence rates were calculated by using postcensus esti-
mates for July 1, 1992, through July 1, 1998, and popula-
tion projections for 1999 from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census. Incidence rates were calculated per 1 million pop-
ulation because of the small number of cases reported to
NNDSS during the study period. Rates were not calculat-
ed for extremely rare conditions (anthrax and western
equine encephalitis) or for conditions for which data were
not collected in all years in the study period (eastern
equine encephalitis). Data from U.S. territories were
excluded in the analysis. 
To provide an example of how historical disease inci-
dence data may be used to assess the likelihood of a report-
ed incident case in the future, we estimated the probability
that a given reported case would have the distribution of
age, sex, race, ethnicity, geographic residence, and season
occurrence using the following formula: P(case) = P(age)
x P(sex) x P(race) x P(ethnicity) x P(geographic residence)
x P(season). The probability is derived from the NNDSS
surveillance data and is calculated under the assumption
that these demographic and geographic variables are inde-
pendent.
Results
Disease reports for seven conditions caused by critical
biologic agents were available for analysis by using
NNDSS data for 1992 through 1999 (Table 1). The num-
ber of reported cases and incidence rates of the diseases
examined in this study, excluding botulism and eastern
equine encephalitis, declined or remained stable in the
United States during the study period. Tularemia and bru-
cellosis were the most frequently reported diseases (111
and 102 cases/year on average, respectively, yielding the
highest estimated incidence rates of 42.1 and 38.7 cases/1
million persons/year, respectively). The least commonly
reported diseases were anthrax, with only one case report-
ed in 1992, and western equine encephalitis, with one case
reported in 1999.
In general, sex-specific incidence rates were higher
among male patients than among female patients for most
study diseases. However, rates for foodborne botulism
were higher among female than among male patients
(Table 2). The age-specific incidence rates varied by dis-
ease. Most reported cases of study diseases were in per-
sons >25 years of age; the exceptions were tularemia
(highest rates were in children 1–14 years of age) and
foodborne botulism (highest rates were in infants <1 year
of age).
Race and ethnicity information was incompletely
reported in NNDSS. More than 50% of reported cases of
unspecified forms of botulism and cholera lacked informa-
tion regarding race. Disease incidence varied among racial
groups. High incidence rates for foodborne botulism,
plague, and tularemia were identified in American Indians
or Alaska Natives, and the highest incidence rates for
cholera and infant botulism were identified in Asian or
Pacific Islanders. The average annual disease-specific inci-
dence rates for Hispanic persons were higher than the rates
for non-Hispanic persons for most study diseases; the
exceptions were plague and tularemia. Tularemia and
plague had apparent seasonal patterns: >50% of cases
occurred in the summer months (June, July, August).
Almost half of reported cholera cases occurred in the win-
ter season (December, January, February) (Figure, Table 2). 
Table 3 lists the conditions caused by critical biologic
agents in rank order by number of reported cases and inci-
dence rates by state of residence; Table 4 gives the geo-
graphic region of residence for case-patients. Plague and
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tribution patterns. The highest incidence rates and number
of cases of plague (86% of total plague cases) were report-
ed from the mountain region (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming,
Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada); the
highest incidence rates and number of cases of tularemia
(78% of total tularemia cases) were reported from states in
the mountain and the west central regions of the United
States. In addition, >60% of botulism case-patients resided
in the Pacific region. However, for most other conditions,
the states reporting the highest number of cases did not
have the highest incidence rates by place of residence. One
exception was Alaska, which reported over twice the num-
ber of cases and almost 20 times the incidence rate for
foodborne botulism compared with the states with the next
highest case counts and incidence rates. 
Tables 2–4 show descriptive NNDSS disease incidence
data with which to estimate the probability that a reported
incident case with selected demographic, geographic, and
seasonal characteristics would occur. For example, if the
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Table 2. Reported cases of conditions caused by critical biologic agents, by demographic characteristics and seasonal occurrence,
  
National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System, United States, 1992–1999
a,b 
Botulism, foodborne  Botulism, other
c  Brucellosis  Cholera  Plague  Tularemia
d  Demographic 
characteristics  Cases (%)  Rate
e  Cases (%)  Rate  Cases (%)  Rate  Cases (%)  Rate  Cases (%)  Rate  Cases (%)  Rate 
Sex                         
Male  101 (45.3)  9.8  86 (58.1)  8.4  487 (59.9)  47.4  82 (36.8)  8.0  41 (53.2)  4.0  587 (66.3)  57.1 
Female  120 (53.8)  11.2  61 (41.2)  5.7  316 (38.9)  29.4  83 (37.2)  7.7  32 (41.6)  3.0  291 (32.9)  27.1 
Sex not stated  2 (0.9)  NC  1 (0.7)  NC  10 (1.2)  NC  58 (26.0)  NC  4 (5.2)  NC  7 (0.8)  NC 
Age group (y)                        
<1  21 (9.4)  68.7  3 (2.0)  9.8  8 (1.0)  26.2  1 (0.4)  3.3  0 (0.0)  C  5 (0.6)  16.4 
1–4  1 (0.4)  0.8  2 (1.4)  1.6  34 (4.2)  27.1  7 (3.1)  5.6  3 (3.9)  2.4  100 (11.3)  79.6 
5–14  9 (4.0)  3.0  1 (0.7)  0.3  94 (11.6)  31.0  4 (1.8)  1.3  10 (13.0)  3.3  189 (21.4)  62.3 
15–24  15 (6.7)  5.2  3 (2.0)  1.0  150 (18.5)  51.8  13 (5.8)  4.5  10 (13.0)  3.5  59 (6.7)  20.4 
25–39  45 (20.2)  8.9  59 (39.9)  11.7  231 (28.4)  45.7  40 (17.9)  7.9  17 (22.1)  3.4  128 (14.5)  25.3 
40–64  88 (39.5)  15.2  75 (50.7)  12.9  229 (28.2)  39.5  71 (31.8)  12.2  23 (29.9)  4.0  243 (27.5)  41.9 
>65   36 (16.1)  13.4  4 (2.7)  1.5  58 (7.1)  21.6  30 (13.5)  11.2  13 (16.9)  4.8  141 (15.9)  52.5 
Age not stated  8 (3.6)  NC  1 (0.7)  NC  9 (1.1)  NC  57 (25.6)  NC  1 (1.3)  NC  20 (2.3)  NC 
Race                         
White  110 (49.3)  6.3  49 (33.1)  2.8  415 (51.0)  23.8  74 (33.2)  4.2  46 (59.7)  2.6  602 (68.0)  34.5 
Black  2 (0.9)  0.8  5 (3.4)  1.9  53 (6.5)  20.0  3 (1.3)  1.1  0  (0)  NC  24 (2.7)  9.1 
American 
Indian or 
Alaska Native 
72 (32.3)  399.3  0 (0)  NC  1 (0.1)  5.6  0 (0)  NC  23 (29.9)  127.6  89 (10.1)  493.6 
Asian or 
Pacific 
Islander 
2 (0.9)  2.7  0 (0)  NC  10 (1.2)  13.3  21 (9.4)  28.0  0 (0)  NC  2 (0.2)  2.7 
Other  1 (0.4)  NC  0 (0)  NC  7 (0.9)  NC  3 (1.3)  NC  0 (0)  NC  0 (0)  NC 
Race not 
stated 
36 (16.1)  NC  94 (63.5)  NC  327 (40.2)  NC  122 (54.7)  NC  8 (10.4)  NC  168 (19.0)  NC 
Ethnicity                         
Hispanic  29 (13.0)  13.3  53 (35.8)  24.3  468 (57.6)  214.5  81 (36.3)  37.1  7 (9.1)  3.2  12 (1.4)  5.5 
Non-Hispanic  113 (50.7)  6.0  66 (44.6)  3.5  143 (17.6)  7.6  56 (25.1)  3.0  62 (80.5)  3.3  407 (46.0)  21.6 
Ethnicity not 
stated 
81 (36.3)  NC  29 (19.6)  NC  202 (24.8)  NC  86 (38.6)  NC  8 (10.4)  NC  466 (52.7)  NC 
Seasonal occurrence
f,g                       
Spring  49 (22.0)  x  26 (17.6)  x  220 (27.1)  x  38 (17.0)  x  19 (24.7)  x  244 (27.6)  x 
Summer  33 (14.8)  x  33 (22.2)  x  215 (26.4)  x  37 (16.6)  x  35 (45.5)  x  417 (47.1)  x 
Fall  35 (15.7)  x  48 (32.4)  x  129 (15.9)  x  32 (14.3)  x  12 (15.6)  x  97 (11.0)  x 
Winter  25 (11.2)  x  37 (25.0)  x  142 (17.5)  x  96 (43.0)  x  2 (2.6)  x  52 (5.9)  x 
Eligible date 
not reported 
81 (36.3)  x  4 (2.7)  x  107 (13.2)  x  20 (9.0)  x  9 (11.7)  x  75 (8.5)  x 
Total   223 (100)  10.6  148 (100)  7.0  813(100)  38.7  223 (100)  10.6  77 (100)  3.7  885 (100)  42.1 
aAbbreviations used: NC, not calculable; x, rate not calculated. 
bReports from 50 U.S. states, Washington D.C., and New York City. 
cIncludes wound and unspecified botulism. 
dNot nationally notifiable 1995–1998. 
eAverage annual incidence rate. 
fIncludes data reported using one of the following date types only: onset date, date of diagnosis, or date of laboratory result. 
gSpring includes March, April, and May; summer includes June, July, and August; fall includes September, October, and November; winter includes December, January, and 
February. next reported case of brucellosis is in a 30-year-old non-
Hispanic white man residing in Florida and occurs in the
summer, under the assumption that these studied variables
are independent, the probability of occurrence of this case
would be 0.02% [P (brucellosis case-patient 1)=P (page
25–39) × P (non-Hispanic) × P (white) × P (male) × P
(Florida) × P (summer)=P (28.4%) × P (17.6%) × P (51%)
× P (59.9%) × P (3.8%) × P (30.5%) = 0.015%]. Similarly,
if the next two reported tularemia case-patients are a 50-
year-old non-Hispanic white man in the West South
Central United States with onset in the summer (case-
patient 1) and a 20-year-old non-Hispanic black woman in
the West South Central region with onset in the summer
(case-patient 2), then P(tularemia case-patient 1) = 0.86%,
and an analogous calculation could be made for the subse-
quent case, P (tularemia case-patient 2) = 0.004%.
Therefore, the probability that those two cases would have
the observed characteristics would be P (cases 1 and 2) =
P (case-patient 1) x P (case-patient 2) = 0.86% x 0.004%=
3.4–07. 
Discussion
Early detection of and response to a bioterrorist attack
are crucial to decrease illness and deaths, especially in the
event of a covert attack with a biologic agent (17). To
accurately identify unusual or aberrant events prospective-
ly among reports to NNDSS, we characterized the base-
line, or endemic, disease incidence. These baseline data
can be used by healthcare providers and public health
department staff to compare endemic disease distributions
and future reported disease incidence in their jurisdictions.
From 1992 through 1999, all diseases caused by critical
bioterrorist agents occurred at very low incidence rates in
the United States. The most common diseases, tularemia
and brucellosis, had only approximately 100 cases per year
reported to NNDSS. Therefore, each case report of any of
these conditions should be considered a sentinel event.
Anthrax, eastern equine encephalitis, western equine
encephalitis, and plague are so rare that even one case of
these diseases should elicit immediate public health inves-
tigation and action.
Even with such low incidence, we identified patterns in
disease incidence that better prepare us to identify poten-
tial bioterrorism events. In this analysis, certain diseases
appear to be endemic in certain geographic areas (e.g.,
foodborne botulism in Alaska, brucellosis and plague in
the western states, and tularemia in the central United
States). Sporadic disease incidence outside of these
regions might indicate aberrant activity. Similarly, certain
diseases were common among certain demographic
groups. For example, our study indicated a high cholera
incidence rate in Asians or Pacific Islanders and a high bot-
ulism incidence rate in American Indians and Alaska
Natives. Higher incidence rates for brucellosis and
tularemia occurred in men and person $25 years of age
(18). Reports of cases clustered in different demographic
groups might suggest unusual disease activity potentially
associated with bioterrorism or an opportunity for targeted
prevention activities.
An explanation of these identified disease incidence
patterns becomes clear when we examine disease-specific
literature. Since 1989 and before the recent bioterrorism-
related anthrax events, only one case of anthrax was
reported in the United States, a marked decrease from a
yearly average of 130 cases in the early 20th century
(19–21). The decline in human disease caused by the crit-
ical agents is believed to have directly resulted from
decreased incidence of animal diseases associated with
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Figure. Reported cases of condi-
tions caused by critical biologic
agents, by month of onset,
National Notifiable Disease
Surveillance System, United
States, 1992–1999. Cases are
reported with one of the following
types of dates: onset date, date of
diagnosis, or date of laboratory
result. Reports are from the 50
U.S. states, Washington, D.C.,
and New York City. 
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Most outbreaks of foodborne botulism in the United
States, especially in Alaska, have been associated with
home-prepared foods, including fermented fish (22–25).
High cholera incidence rates in western states and among
Asians or Pacific Islanders have previously been associat-
ed with travel to cholera-endemic areas of the world
(26,27). The marked seasonal distribution of cholera in the
winter season resulted from a large outbreak associated
with exposure on a commercial airline flight in February
1992 (27). Plague and tularemia are zoonotic diseases with
recognized geographic and temporal distributions similar
to those of the human cases reported to NNDSS (28–33).
These patterns are probably associated with the distribu-
tion of wild rodents or domestic mammal reservoirs and
hosts in the western United States or arthropod vector
activity in the central states during the summer months.
Given historical trends of studied conditions, disease-
specific formulas derived from the surveillance data can be
used to estimate the probability that a given series of N
cases of the disease would have the distribution of age,
race, sex, ethnicity, and seasonal occurrence that was
observed. The probability of disease occurrence estimated
in this analysis was based on the assumption that these
studied variables are independent. In fact, sequentially
reported cases would likely cluster temporally. Therefore,
the season-specific probability used in the formula to esti-
mate the likelihood of disease cluster may be underesti-
mated. In most cases, the probability derived from these
surveillance data gives us the information on expected
probability of endemic disease occurrence. Therefore,
while further evaluation is needed, this information may be
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Table 3. Conditions caused by critical biologic agents, ranking by number of reported cases and incidence rates (per 1 million 
population) by state of residence, National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System, United States,
a 1992–1999 
Rank by reported cases  Rank by incidence rate 
Disease  Rank  State  No. of cases  Rank  State  Average annual incidence rate 
Botulism, foodborne 
  1  Alaska  72  1  Alaska  1,493.7 
  2  Washington  33  2  Washington  75.7 
  3  Texas  27  3  Idaho  75.0 
  4  California  25  4  Wyoming  26.1 
  5  Idaho  7  5  Colorado  20.0 
Botulism, other
b 
  1  California  128  1  D.C.  51.5 
  2  New Mexico  3  2  California  42.1 
  3  NYC  3  3  New Mexico  25.4 
  4  D.C.  2  4  Mississippi  10.6 
  5  Mississippi  2  5  Utah  7.3 
Brucellosis 
  1  California  215  1  Wyoming  156.5 
  2  Texas  200  2  Texas  133.0 
  3  N. Carolina  58  3  N. Carolina  100.7 
  4  Illinois  53  4  Iowa  92.3 
  5  Florida  31  5  Arizona  87.1 
Cholera 
  1  California  115  1  Nevada  130.4 
  2  Nevada  16  2  California  45.5 
  3  Texas  14  3  Hawaii  42.4 
  4  Louisiana  7  4  Alaska  20.8 
  5  Arizona  6  5  Louisiana  20.2 
Plague 
  1  New Mexico  35  1  New Mexico  258.9 
  2  Arizona  14  2  Arizona  40.7 
  3  Colorado  11  3  Colorado  36.7 
  4  California  9  4  Wyoming  26.1 
  5  Utah  3  5  Utah  19.2 
Tularemia
c 
  1  Arkansas  211  1  S. Dakota  1,268.0 
  2  Missouri  158  2  Arkansas  1,061.5 
  3  S. Dakota  74  3  Montana  531.4 
  4  Oklahoma  62  4  Missouri  371.3 
  5  Montana  37  5  Oklahoma  236.7 
aReports from 50 U.S. states, Washington, D.C., and New York City (NYC). 
bIncludes wound and unspecified botulism. 
cNot nationally notifiable 1995–1998. used to compare with current disease incidence data and
may serve to set reasonable thresholds for use by health
departments considering initiating an epidemiologic inves-
tigation of a suspected outbreak or incident case report. 
The list of critical biologic agents also includes agents
that could be spread through contaminated food or water
(e.g., Salmonella spp. or Shigella spp.). Because diseases
caused by these food- and waterborne agents are more
common in the United States compared to bioterrorism-
associated diseases such as plague or tularemia, outbreaks
associated with these more common agents will most like-
ly continue to be identified through ongoing surveillance
and health communication efforts that require a strong
public health infrastructure. With the increasing availabili-
ty of electronic health outcome data, CDC and certain
states are evaluating the application of statistical aberra-
tion detection algorithms to state and national notifiable
disease incidence data to aid the rapid identification of
unusual disease incidence patterns (34). To support early
detection of potential bioterrorist events, these or similar
methods have also been applied at the state and local pub-
lic health system level, where data are more timely (com-
pared with national NNDSS data).
Even at the local and state level, however, passive noti-
fiable disease reporting from healthcare providers and lab-
oratories is often not timely or complete (35,36). Disease
incidence reported in this analysis is likely an underesti-
mate because of underreporting by physicians and health-
care providers. The recent terrorism-associated anthrax
attacks highlighted the need for healthcare provider recog-
nition of the syndromes associated with potential bioter-
rorist agents and rapid communication of relevant health
outcome information between the healthcare community
and the public health system. Physician case reporting is
generally more complete for conditions that cause severe
clinical illnesses (e.g., plague) but less complete for dis-
eases that cause mild clinical illness (37). In the United
States, the completeness of notifiable disease reporting has
been estimated to range from 9% to 99% (37–40).
Healthcare providers lack awareness of reporting require-
ments, and changes in surveillance case definitions may
also lead to underreporting of notifiable diseases (37). In
addition, state- and disease-specific differences in surveil-
lance practices or in the amount of resources applied to
surveillance efforts affect how actively cases are solicited
or identified. Increasing awareness among healthcare
providers and laboratories regarding accurate and rapid
identification of conditions related to critical agents and
local reporting requirements and methods is necessary to
establish and maintain communication between the med-
ical and public health communities. Increased resources
(both human and technical) for surveillance at the state and
local level may augment disease reporting as well.
Although most diseases caused by critical biologic
agents are nationally notifiable conditions, diseases have
historically been added to or deleted from the nationally
notifiable disease list on the basis of criteria that did not
include their etiologic agent’s potential use in a bioterror-
ist event. Therefore, not all conditions caused by critical
biologic agents are nationally notifiable diseases. For
example, tularemia was temporarily removed from the
nationally notifiable disease list in 1995 because of
decreasing incidence. Eradicated diseases (e.g., smallpox
[41–43]) are not technically nationally notifiable, nor are
emerging infections (e.g., Nipah virus infection and the
viral hemorrhagic fevers). However, local and state public
health code typically supports the reporting of unusual
events that pose a public health threat. Even when nation-
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Table 4. Reported cases of conditions caused by critical biologic agents, by geographic region of residence, National Notifiable 
Disease Surveillance System, United States, 1992-1999 
  Botulism         
  Foodborne  Other  Brucellosis  Cholera  Plague  Tularemia 
Geographic region
a  Cases (%)  Cases (%)  Cases (%)  Cases (%)  Cases (%)  Cases (%) 
New England  1  (0.5)  1 (0.7)  9 (1.1)  7 (3.1)  0 (0.0)  11 (1.2) 
Middle Atlantic  9  (4.0)  4 (2.7)  20 (2.5)  16 (7.2)  0 (0.0)  17 (1.9) 
East North Central  4  (1.8)  1 (0.7)  82 (10.1)  12 (5.4)  0 (0.0)  46 (5.2) 
West North Central  2  (0.9)  1 (0.7)  37 (4.6)  3 (1.4)  0 (0.0)  296 (33.5) 
South Atlantic  14  (6.3)  4 (2.7)  116 (14.3)  14 (6.3)  0 (0.0)  32 (3.6) 
East South Central  10  (4.5)  2 (1.4)  20 (2.5)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  24 (2.7) 
West South Central  28 (12.6)  0 (0.0)  224 (27.6)  21 (9.4)  1 (1.3)  283 (32.0) 
Mountain  21  (9.4)  5 (3.4)  65 (8.0)  28 (12.6)  66 (85.7)  114 (12.9) 
Pacific  134 (60.1)  130 (87.8)  240 (29.5)  122 (54.7)  10 (13.0)  62 (7.0) 
Total  223 (100.0)  148 (100.0)  813 (100.0)  223 (100.0)  77 (100.0)  885 (100.0) 
aNew England includes Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut; Middle Atlantic includes New York, New York City, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania; East North Central includes Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin; West North Central includes Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas; South Atlantic includes Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida; East South Central includes Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi; West South Central includes Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, and Texas; Mountain includes Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada; Pacific includes Washington, Oregon, 
California, Alaska, and Hawaii. ally notifiable, however, not all conditions caused by criti-
cal biologic agents are designated as reportable in all states
because states determine which conditions should be
reportable in their state based on their own public health
priorities and needs. Among the diseases examined in this
study, only foodborne botulism was reportable in all states
for the entire study period. To enhance and expand surveil-
lance for potential bioterrorist events, CDC and the
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists have
recently added Q fever and reinstated tularemia to the list
of nationally notifiable diseases. CDC continues to collab-
orate with the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists and state health departments to ensure
that all nationally notifiable diseases caused by critical bio-
logic agents are reportable in all states.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting specific
incidence rates. Incidence rates for study diseases may also
be underestimated because they were calculated on the
basis of the U.S. population of all 50 states for the mid-
study year of 1995, not limited to the population of report-
ing states for each year. Although rates might be underes-
timated, the patterns identified would not likely be affect-
ed. Although CDC and the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists have defined the standard case definitions
for all nationally notifiable diseases, differences exist
regarding how states interpret and apply these criteria. For
example, although observed incidence rates of foodborne
botulism were very high among children aged <1 year,
these cases might be infant botulism reported as foodborne
botulism. Therefore, standardized application of surveil-
lance case definitions needs to be encouraged. Race and
ethnicity information is incomplete in NNDSS data, poten-
tially leading to underestimation of race- and ethnicity-
specific incidence rates (44,45).
Overall, the incidence of conditions caused by critical
microbiologic agents with the potential for use in acts of
terrorism is low in the United States, as reported to
NNDSS. Therefore, each case report should initially be
considered a sentinel event requiring further investiga-
tion, especially reports from nonendemic regions of con-
ditions with identified geographic distribution patterns.
For potential bioterrorism-related conditions that are
endemic and have low incidence, nontraditional surveil-
lance methods (e.g., sentinel emergency department sur-
veillance [46]) and complementary data sources (e.g.,
electronic laboratory reporting [47]) might be used to
complement traditional sources of surveillance data (e.g.,
NNDSS) and can enhance our ability to detect changes in
disease incidence.
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